G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN
VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while
she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City.
She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for
"multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged
after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of
saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15,
1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as
broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of
"Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The
Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased
Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us,
Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left
by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other
heirs to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she
claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts
of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is
hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that
admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of
the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The
possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a
person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs
thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed
on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from
causing injury to any one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner
of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no
doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident
in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical
person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own
house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that
she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according
to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually
as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house
with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The
dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in
1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their
hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that
they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing
that she died as a result thereof.
RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared
that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites
for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve
itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between
the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first,
Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her
death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after
she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds
that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep
satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v.
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that
the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of
the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is
sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even
if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's
contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the
dog is not acceptable. In
fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the
animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control.
And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog
was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not
speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause
injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that
Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be
faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is
based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the
damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the
findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as
to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as
prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back
to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least
be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
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